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Restructurings are the order of the day. Various major companies have just experienced or are in
the midst of a major restructuring. This paper presents an overview of the literature on restructuring,
firm performance and control mechanisms. To study the phenomena coherently, the concept of an
overall restructuring process is presented. Theoretically restructuring has not yet been defined in the
framework of the restructuring process formula. Neither have different forms of restructuring found
their places within such a structure. Empirically several issues of the process have been studied but
on a rather partial basis and mainly in statistical approaches only. Attention for all-inclusive case
studies came from Donaldson (1984, 1994).
This paper aims at laying the foundation of doing case study research studies with respect to Dutch
firms in the 1990s.
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1 Introduction
Restructurings are the order of the day. In the early 1990s, many large Dutch companies, such as
Fokker, ABN-AMRO, and Shell experienced a major restructuring. In spite of the many similarities,
the performances of these companies were dissimilar in several ways. First of all, while ABN-AMRO
and Shell reported record profits and thus showed no obvious need for restructuring, Philips and
Fokker announced deep red figures, and therefore they simply had to restructure to survive. Also,
owing to the stimulus of different control mechanisms, ABN-AMRO and Shell were able to
implement the changes voluntarily, while Fokker was forced to restructure. The structures affected
were also not identical, ABN-AMRO and Shell focused on the asset and organizational structure,
while Fokker had to focus on the asset, and organizational as well as on the capital structure.
Research on stand-alone (restructuring) activities, such as mergers and spin-offs, has been compre-
hensive. Less attention has been paid to the combination of these activities as the outcome of an
overall restructuring process. Also, the literature largely ignores that activities like a reorganization
or an asset sale are not stand-alone activities, but may be just one component of a consistent over-
all corporate strategy. Research should therefore be conducted into the overall strategy, since the
results of one stand-alone activity may be offset or reinforced by the related activities. The purpose
of this paper is to give an overview of the literature on restructuring, firm performance and control
mechanisms as part of an overall restructuring process (see Figure 1).
This restructuring process starts with the goal of the firm, which can be related to either the
balanced stakeholder or the shareholder view (section 2). One possible outcome of the restructuring
process is a change of the goal of the firm necessitated by, for example, a changed environment.
The five basic firm structures used, that is asset, capital, governance, cost and organization, are
modelled in the light of the ultimate corporate goal to be attained (section 3). These five structures,
influenced by market and industry factors, determine the performance of the company. This
performance can be measured in several ways, for example in accounting earnings, market returns
and discounted cash flows. The merits and drawbacks of some of these measures are discussed in
section 4. Applying the appropriate performance measures is one of the prerequisites of triggering
voluntary change. Section 5 elaborates on the internal control mechanisms, namely the board of
directors, works council and blockholders as well as on external control mechanisms, which are the
defence measures, the market for corporate control, the product, capital, and labour markets. The
function of these control mechanisms is twofold. First of all, the control mechanisms supply
management with a day-to-day feedback on its performance, giving management a chance to
gradually adjust the firm-specific structures. Examples of this feedback are the stock marketRestructuring, ..... December 1995 2
reactions to announcements of acquisitions or divestures and the turnover rate in personnel.
Figure 1 The restructuring process
Secondly, the control mechanisms can either induce or even force management to the execution of
major structure changes, i.e. changing the relationship among the key elements. Firm performance
must therefore be seen as consisting of firm results (e.g. ROI) and feedback from the control
mechanisms (e.g. stock price).
Control forces, whether internal or external, are not always the driving force behind change. The
control mechanisms can also delay a restructuring process, initiated by management. A firm
showing (record) profits, but still not earning a competitive return, should restructure in order to
increase its returns. Because eventually, when investors are not provided with an adequate returnsRestructuring, ..... December 1995 3
on their investments and a change for the better is not expected, they will move their capital to
another company or even to another country. For this reason, management has to convince other
stakeholders, in many cases especially unionized labour, of the company’s financial position.
Financial sacrifices of top management, dividend cuts, and reported losses which are "..to a large
degree driven by special earnings charges that reflect managers’ real restructuring decisions, but
whose timing is discretionary across (..union..) negotiation and non-negotiation years", can be used
for this purpose.
Consequently, the following events can occur when firm performance is not satisfactory (the
symbols used correspond to those in Figure 1):
(a) Although firm performance is not satisfactory, and the need for change therefore exists,
management only makes minor adjustments to the existing strategy and structures, or
changes nothing at all. Firm performance will deteriorate even further, until eventually event
(b),(c) or (d) will occur. However, it may take several years before actual intervention by
either the internal or the external controls will take place.
(b) Management is aware of the need for change, and, while still in control, implements the
necessary changes by either liquidating the firm, restructuring or a takeover/merger.
Management may have two opportunities to do so under normal governance procedures,
namely
(1) voluntary, changes are prompted by the feedback from the internal or external control
mechanisms
(2) involuntary, changes are prompted by threats from the control mechanisms
(c) The internal controls resort to firing the incumbent management, management looses
control.
(d) The external controls intervene and force either a restructuring, takeover or liquidation of
the firm, here also management looses control over the firm.
Section 6 discusses the consequences of involuntary versus voluntary changes. A change is
implemented involuntary when it is a response to an overt or threatened adversarial pressure by
control mechanisms, i.e. an hostile attack on incumbent management.
1 The distinguishing feature
between feedback and threats is that feedback is supplied by the markets, and threats are raised by
parties involved. The dismissal of incumbent management by the board and the subsequent
restructuring effectuated by the new management has an intermediate form. The dismissal is a
hostile attack on incumbent management, and therefore poses an involuntary change. The new
management however implement the changes voluntary. The above mentioned events are
discussed in section 7, along with the outcomes of the process, viz. liquidation, restructuring, doingRestructuring, ..... December 1995 4
nothing or take-over. Section 8 reviews the literature on voluntary, internally motivated, changes.
Section 9 concludes this paper.
Donaldson (1990, 1994) is one of the few scholars who performed detailed case studies on
restructurings. For twelve public corporations he identified how they, voluntarily, (tried to) achieve
increased efficiency over the years, by changing corporate goals, strategy, and structures. This
efficiency was measured by improved financial performance, as measured by amongst others return
on investment, and by the response of investors, as measured by stock market performance. He
concluded that "voluntary restructuring may take longer to achieve the same ends, but it has greater
and more universal potential for successful adaption to change than that which is imposed from the
outside". However, a voluntary restructuring can be far more costly than an involuntary change,
owing to the longer time needed to restructure and to the superior negotiation position of many
stakeholders like employees. Changes in asset and capital structures can be effectuated within a
relatively short period, but changes in contracts takes considerably more time. Also, the former
changes can be (easily) effectuated by a raider, while the latter changes requires a deep insight in
the business and bargaining positions of the diverse stakeholders, and are therefore more easily
achieved by the (incumbent) management. Consequently, the longer time needed to effectuate a
voluntary restructuring should be weighted against the disadvantages of an involuntary restructuring,
such as more drastic measures. Especially understanding the reasons why certain companies are
able to restructure voluntarily, while others have to go (almost) bankrupt before something changes,
can provide valuable indications how to structure a responsive corporate governance structure.
2 The goal of the firm
A firm has various groups of stakeholders, each group with its own interests and its own (potential)
claim on the revenue stream of the company. The undiversified investor in human capital (including
management itself), for example, is interested in money, career opportunities and/or prestige
(corporate jet and luxurious headquarters),and total risk, while the diversified investor in financial
capital is interested in the systematic risk and shareholder value added. An example of this conflict
of interests is the divergent views of both parties on diversification. For an employee, diversification
stands for upward mobility, more prestige and job security. On the other hand, the capital investor is
only interested in diversification if the return on the capital invested by him per unit of risk increases,
and not when just the total return of the company increases, that is he prefers quality of earnings
above quantity.
The 1960s and 1970s favoured human capital, which resulted in the 1980s in "an increasing
suspicion that the natural instincts of career professionals led them to place the well-being of long-Restructuring, ..... December 1995 5
term investors of human capital, including themselves, ahead of the well-being of investors of
financial capital".
2 This erosion of trust necessitated considerable changes in the firm’s structures
and strategy. Those changes were often aimed at reducing management discretion over investment,
for example by returning excess capital to the investors, reducing capacity or rethinking of operating
policies and strategy decisions.
The conflict of interests between the various groups of stakeholders requires a continuous compro-
mising of top management, although most of the times the scales are tipped to the group with the
highest bargaining power.
Figure 2 Goals of the firm
The balanced stakeholder and the shareholder
view are the two main views regarding the
ultimate goal a company should pursue (Figure
2). The balanced stakeholder view weights the
shareholder interests together with the inter-
ests of the other stakeholders, such as credi-
tors and employees. In this view, the company
is not an annex to the shareholders, but a
stand-alone entity, striving for corporate wealth
and growth, with limiting conditions as stability, and, especially, continuity. Of course, this view does
not release management from its obligation to earn a rate of return on invested capital required by
its shareholders! This organic concept of the firm is mainly found in Germanic countries. In the
shareholder view, the shareholder interests are set over the interests of the other stakeholders,
given the prices of the inputs of goods and (financial) services.
The distribution of the proceeds is characteris-
Figure 3 Example of stakeholder versus shareholder view
A firm has 100 to invest. The choice is between two projects,
each requiring an investment of 100, while the risk does not
change. The first results in shareholder value added of 20, and
has no consequences for the employees. The second project
results in no shareholder value added (the required rate of
return is the actual rate of return) and results in an, not
quantifiable, increase of career opportunities for personnel. The
first project will be chosen when maximizing shareholder value,
while either the first or the second project can be chosen in the
balanced stakeholder view.
tic of each of the views mentioned above, and
not especially the performance indicators used.
In the shareholders view, an investment should
be made when either (a) the risk decreases,
given the return or (b) the return increases
given the risk. But for the balanced stakehold-
ers view a third factor should be considered, namely the, mainly not quantifiable, interests of other
stakeholders (see Figure 3). Since the required return by equity-investors should be met in the latterRestructuring, ..... December 1995 6
view also, the balanced stakeholder view will result in sub-optimal solutions as seen from the share-
holder, but will still result in satisficing solutions.
Consequently, a clear-cut distinction should be made between (a) the valuation approach, used to,
for example, determine of the proceeds of a new investment, and (b) the distribution of the pro-
ceeds over the stakeholders (Figure 4). Stewart (1991) for example, advocates in his "Quest for
value" economic value added, for which an adjusted profit concept is used. The advantage of this
approach is the use of easily available, but adjusted, book values instead of the, subject to
estimation errors, theoretically correct Discounted Cash Flow method (DCF).
Figure 4 Distribution of and determining the proceeds
Determining the proceeds,
based on:
- Discounted cash flow
method
- stock market values
- book values






Although different views on how to solve the
conflict of interests between groups of stakeho-
lders, still exist, these views are becoming
more congruent due to the globalization of
investment and capital flows. For example,
even the Japanese keiretsu seems to be vol-
untarily adjusting itself to the globalization
3,b y
doing more business with foreign partners,
diminishing the cross-shareholdings, and buying more materials outside the group.
The prevailing American line of thought is the shareholder’s view. For this reason, research has
perhaps mainly focused on agency problems between managing directors and shareholders.
Rappaport (1986, p.1) claims that "... the principle that the fundamental objective of the business
corporation is to increase the value of its shareholders’ investment is widely accepted.....". Indeed,
(almost) all the recent American financial economics literature endorse this principle, but this axiom
does not necessarily hold for all companies. Or, as Jensen (1993) says : "No longer can we
assume managers automatically act (in opposition to their own best interests) to maximize firm
value". European managers often state that they act in the interests of shareholders as well as
other stakeholders, like employees. The Dutch government has even voiced the balanced stake-
holders view in the law, by granting rights to the works council (Ondernemingsraad), the supervisory
board, and founding shareholders and directors (priority shares) which are quite unknown in the
Anglo-Saxon countries. Cools (1993) found empirical confirmation of this "balanced stakeholder"
view. He interviewed the Chief Financial Officers of fifty listed firms in the Netherlands with the
purpose to acquire an insight in the capital structure choice of these companies. He found that only
6% of these Dutch corporations saw maximizing shareholder wealth as their primary goal, as
opposed to 78 % favouring profit maximization, aimed at continuity. Cools (1993) also found thatRestructuring, ..... December 1995 7
while 52% saw no hierarchy in the stakeholders of the firm, only 8% saw the shareholder as the
most important stakeholder. He remarks "Apparently, even the CFO, the executive who is most
involved with shareholders is not inclined to even pretend that shareholders are the owners of the
firm. This clearly illustrates the Dutch corporate governance system in which shareholders are just
one of many other stakeholders who each try to get their piece of the pie". Duffhues (1994, p. 46)
suggests that some misunderstandings regarding the implication of wealth maximizing, may explain
this controversy. Another indication of this view is the "Top 100 Nederland" published by a Dutch
magazine (Financieel Economisch Magazine), ranking the largest concerns on net added value (net
added value) base, because "the Net Added Value conception stems from the view that a company
has to generate a reasonable income not just for the shareholders, but also for all participants. The
distribution over the participants of the generated net added value is therefore at least as interesting
as the volume".
4 FEM uses employees, providers of capital and government as participants.
Summarizing, the balanced stakeholder view is likely to be (still) prevailing in the Netherlands.
Therefore, it seems not appropriate to use only the premises of the shareholder value approach in
assessing Dutch companies. The differences between the Dutch and American business conditions
should be thoroughly understood to be able to explain major changes in the structures of Dutch
companies.
3 Firm specific structures
A firm consists of several structures. A "structure" can be defined as a "specific, stable relationship
among the key elements of a particular function or process".
5 Frequently companies pursue a
redesign of several structures in a time-span of several years. A restructuring effectuated by
incumbent management may complete the following steps once the company becomes aware that it
is performing below standard. The first step may be reducing the number of employees (cost
structure) along with a reorganization of activities (organizational structure), followed by the sale of
underperforming businesses, and by focusing on the core business (asset structure). The next step
can be changing the incentives of management (governance structure) and the internal structures. If
these restructuring activities do not result in the required improvements, a debt restructuring
becomes a possibility (capital structure). Consequently, restructuring must not be seen as an
individual transaction, but as a process, generally taking several years to complete. By reviewing
the literature on firm response to poor performance, the same five basic structures within a firm can
be identified. Wruck (1990) noted that "turnover in top management and changes in corporate
governance indicate that corporate raiders are disciplined for poor performance", thereby referring
to the governance structure. In addition, frequently taken actions in the poor performance periodRestructuring, ..... December 1995 8
include (a) changing the size and scope of operations, influencing the asset, cost and frequently the
Figure 5 Structures of the firm
organization structures, and (b) financial actions like debt restructurings, employee layoffs and
overhead downsizing, influencing the capital and cost structures. The structures that can be distilled
from these actions are the asset, capital, governance, cost, and organizational structure
6. These
five structures,as depicted in Figure 5, are affected by the applicable goal of the firm. When Figure
5 is merged with Figure 1, these structures describe the status quo of the firm, its point of departure
of the restructuring process. These structures together determine firm performance. The outcome of
the restructuring process is a change in one or more of these structures.
The various stand-alone changes in these five structures have been researched comprehensively.
Empirical evidence on the consequences of a LBO, merger or share repurchase is considerable,
while far less research is conducted into the combined elements of a restructuring. Of course,
frequently only one structure causes the initial problems, while in time other structures are
negatively affected. Consequently, the odds are that the longer management takes to react, the
more radical the necessary changes will be. For example, performance decline can be the result of
investments with returns below the required rate. In an early phase, cutting cost or disposing of the
assets might be sufficient to solve the difficulties. If, however, management does not react, the
organization can become highly leveraged and subsequently financially distressed. Now, besides
cutting cost or disposal, debt restructuring is also necessary to solve the financial distress.
Another example of more radical changes necessitated by a negligent management reaction is a
company using a sales prices denoted in US dollars, while its purchase prices are in Dutch guilders.Restructuring, ..... December 1995 9
Now, when the exchange rate of the dollar falls against the guilder, the margin falls and manage-
ment intervention may be necessary. In an early phase, the problem can be solved by forcing the
suppliers to settle the accounts in dollars also, thereby shifting the risk to the suppliers. When
management postpones intervention until financial distress is inevitable, more drastic measures
such as a debt restructuring, bringing in of new equity capital or the cutting-down of the work-force
may be necessary. Of course, suppliers will only be inclined to financial sacrifice if they are
convinced that the company is in serious trouble.
3.1 Definition of restructuring
In most surveys, the term restructuring (corporate, financial etc.) is not explicitly defined. It is used
as a general expression, including different transactions. Chew (1993, p. 462) gives a fine example
of how the term "restructuring" is used by stating that: "The 1980s saw an unprecedented wave of
corporate acquisitions, divestures, spin-offs, split-ups, ESOP’s, partial public offerings, limited
partnerships, and leveraged buy-outs - all of which have been yoked together under the name of
‘corporate restructuring’".
Copeland and Weston (1988) regard corporate restructuring as a general term of many forms of
corporate activities. Four groups of activities are identified, namely (a) activities involving the
combining of assets (i.e. expansion; examples are mergers and acquisitions, tender offers and joint
ventures), (b) activities involving the un-combining of assets (i.e. sell-offs; examples are spin-offs
and divestures), (c) activities involving the establishing and defending rights to assets (i.e. corporate
control; examples are premium buy-backs, standstill agreements, anti-takeover amendments, proxy
contests), and (d) activities involving the altering the format of asset control (i.e. changes in owner-
ship structure; examples are exchange offers, share repurchases, going private and leveraged buy-
outs). This corresponds with the Rappaport’s (1986) Phase I restructurings, namely consisting of
one-time transactions, without altering the day-to-day management of the business.
On the other hand, Ellis and Williams (1993), and Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1990) based their
grouping of transactions on the possible steps a company could take to maximize shareholder
value, seen from the viewpoint of a potential raider. They argue that maximizing shareholder value
should be the goal of management; in case the incumbent managers do not maximize shareholder
value, others will do it for them. As a result, the battle for corporate control will be lost. The
subsequent change in corporate control is then effectuated by replacing incumbent managers
and/or an unfriendly take-over. For this reason, they claim it is in the best interest of both managers
and shareholders to keep the gap between potential and actual value creation as close as possible.
Management has several tools to reduce the gap. These tools can be classified into three sets ofRestructuring, ..... December 1995 10
strategies, namely (a) strategies to improve operations, like increasing revenues or reducing
corporate overheads, (b) strategies based on acquiring or disposing of assets, like liquidation or
acquisition, and (c) financial engineering activities, like share repurchase or financing mix. This
approach corresponds with Rappaport’s Phase II restructuring, in which shareholder value approach
is employed not only in the one-time transactions, but also in the day-to-day management.
Summarizing, restructurings appear in many different gradations. Restructurings can be limited to a
change of the asset structure (asset restructuring) only, a change of only the capital structure
(capital restructuring) or a change in only one of the other structures. On the other hand, restructur-
ings can also affect all elements of the corporate financial structure, described by Donaldson (1994)
as the allocation of the corporate flow of funds - cash or credit - and to the strategic or contractual
decision rules that direct the flow and determine the value-added
7 and its distribution among the
various corporate constituencies. The elements of the corporate financial structure include the scale
of the investment base, the mix between active investment and defensive reserves, the focus of
investment (choice of revenue source), the rate at which earnings are reinvested, the mix of debt
and equity contracts, the nature, degree and cost of corporate oversight (overhead), the distribution
of expenditures between current and future revenue potential, and the nature and duration of wage
and benefit contracts". This definition includes elements of all of the five structures. The characteris-
tic of corporate restructuring is the re-arranging of ownership/control rights. Corporate financial
restructuring indicates that the control and/or ownership structure should not necessarily change.
3.2 The individual structures
The asset structure is the result of the process of planning and managing the firm’s investments,
and can be described as the composition of the total assets the firm exploits to realize its goals.
Consequently, the balanced stakeholder view and the shareholder view may result in a different
asset structure. For example, constructions like franchising and subcontracting allow firms to control
certain other companies or stages in the industry chain without actually owning them. While
shareholders are in favour of these arrangements when they add value, employees can be more
reserved, since career opportunities may be reduced. The fit and focus of the business (units) are
reconsidered when assets are restructured. A typical asset restructuring consists of categorizing
divisions/businesses into core and non-core. The non-core businesses are then sold, and the
proceeds of these disposals are used to fund acquisitions in the core business. A change is
accomplished in the number of segments in which the company is industrious, resulting in a change
in sales and total assets. An asset restructuring has also its impact on other structures within the
company, the capital structure usually changes since acquisitions have to be financed if theRestructuring, ..... December 1995 11
proceeds of the disposals are not sufficient or when the proceeds are used to reduce debt levels.
The change in investment base may also induce another organizational structure, for example from
an product-oriented to a function-oriented organization.
The capital structure choice deals with the form and relative amounts in which securities should be
issued to finance the investments and the price that should be paid for the use of the capital. The
capital structure refers to, among others the specific mixture of long-term debt and equity the firm
uses to finance its operations. Capital restructuring changes this mixture. An example of a capital
restructuring is the diminishing of discretionary reserves. As a consequence, each new investment
has to be assessed by the external capital markets, since the internal capital market has dried up.
Now, the risk of unproductive investment, that is investment with a negative net marginal return, is
eliminated. Especially managing directors of mature industries with limited growth potential are
subject to the over-investment risk. Investment is those industries are often done to diversify or to
maintain their earnings and sales. These investments are usually in the best interest of the
employees, but not necessarily in the best interest of the capital investors. An other example of
capital restructuring is a rights issue, frequently aimed at reviving a company. The proceeds of the
issue are then used to cut down debt.
The governance structure is the "different sets of incentives, safeguards, and dispute resolution pro-
cesses used to control and coordinate the actions of various stakeholders" (Kester and Luehrman
1993, p.439). In fact, an ideal governance system would give managing directors enough freedom
to work and make them accountable for what they did with that freedom. Shareholders, and in the
Netherlands employees as well, would have enough information to monitor the managing directors.
While the governance system will be different for each country since it reflects legal, regulatory, and
tax regimes, it is feasible to develop an optimal governance strategy for a company.
The two main components of cost structure are overhead and costs of operations (the distribution of
the claims on the corporate revenue stream by the primary contributors to the productive process).
Changes in cost structure can be effectuated by the redesigning of formal and/or informal contracts
or new production methods. Examples of new production methods are the re-location of labour-
intensive production to low-labour-cost countries or the shift from labour-intensive to capital-
intensive production methods. In the 1990s cost restructurings are frequently effectuated by cutting
(severely) back the work force, especially the overhead (=staff) departments. Cost restructurings are
often combined with changes in the organization structure.Restructuring, ..... December 1995 12
Changing the organization structure involves the altering of the number of divisions or subsidiaries
or changes in management decision rights. This is defined as a reorganization. Brickley and Van
Drunen (1990) found that "on average internal structure changes occur as a value-increasing
response to changes in the environment facing the firm. Two cases where this change appears to
occur are 1) when a firm’s investment opportunities change and 2) when the firm is doing poorly
relative to competing firms."
4 Performance
The underlying reason for a restructuring is
Figure 6 Performance measurements
always the need or possibility to improve the
performance of the company, or "at the heart
of restructuring is evidence of erosion of econ-
omic value and financial benefit associated
with the strategy and structure in place.
8"
Deterioration of firm performance can be
detected by evaluating the applicable results
against some standard, expressing the inter-
ests of the evaluating party. The possibly
relevant data are stock market data and/or
data from within the firm, the latter either
based on accounting or on discounted cash
flow techniques (Figure 6).
Although stock market data seems the most logic, generally least manipulable, measure to evaluate
the company’s performance, the use of stock market data has several drawbacks (section 4.1). The
firm’s results should be compared to the results of other companies, operating in the firm’s own
industry, as well as in the market as a whole (section 4.2).
4.1 Performance measurements
4.1.1 Stock market data
First of all, the "balanced stakeholders" view is incompatible with stock market data, since these
data do not represent the interests of other stakeholders. Restructuring affects more stakeholders
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holders by changes in bond prices. Even the government might be affected by an increase in unem-
ployment benefits or a change in corporate taxes. This implies that when shareholder wealth, as
measured by the stock returns, increases, this simply may be a redistribution of wealth, and not a
real efficiency gain. Consequently, while stock market data is sufficient in the shareholders view, it
proposes insufficient information to be used as unique performance measurement in the stakehol-
ders view.
Secondly, anticipated structure changes altering future cash flows are already included in the stock
price. As a result, abnormal stock returns can only be generated by unanticipated changes in
performance. For example, a poorly performing company will earn a normal stock return when the
bad performance is anticipated, and thus incorporated in the stock price. The reverse also holds,
companies with an expected excellent performance will not earn an abnormal return. Consequently,
stock returns can not be used adequately to measure the performance of the company over a given
period of time. Stock data can be used for event studies, when the stock market reaction to an
announcement of the firm is observed. However, even then only the unanticipated portion of the
announcement is observed.
Also, in case the stockmarket is illiquid, and infrequent transactions determine the stock price, the
quoted price may not reflect the value ascribed to the stock by "the market".
Fourthly, asymmetric information may cause a discrepancy between the market value and the
economic value of the firm.
4.1.2 Standard from within the company
Since the stock market has its obvious merits as a performance measure, but also some draw-
backs, another measure should be found derived from the company itself. This leads to the two
competing valuation approaches, namely the accounting approach and the, theoretically superior,
discounted cash flow approach. The major disadvantage of the DCF-method is the uncertainty of
the necessary cash-flow forecasts. The results of the evaluation of performance based on DCF-
methods will always be subject to discussion, since the outcomes depend on the modelling assump-
tions made. Only voluntary corporate liquidations produce enough information to permit discounting
cash flow techniques, since the discounted value of actual cash flows generated by the liquidating
firm can be compared with the stock price prior to the liquidation announcement.
9 Discounted cash
flows link the stock based measures with the company based measures. For the stock market value
can be seen as the capital the company currently has invested plus a premium (possibly less a
discount) for its economic value added projected and discounted to a present value
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is an example of this linkage, and can be defined as the stock market value divided by the book
value of equity
11.
The drawbacks of the accounting approach are the treatment of intangibles like goodwill, the
influence of different accounting methods on the results and balance sheet, and the possible mani-
pulation of the figures.
This controversy between stock data and accounting data can also be found in the research on
effects of takeovers (Moerland, 1992). Moerland remarks that financial economists generally find,
based on event studies, an overall wealth increase for a merger, while industrial economists, using
accounting measures, do not find this result. He concludes that the differences in the overall result
might well be explained by the differences in research method, such as the characteristics of the
data used and the time frame. However, the finding that bidders at best break-even is not explained
by either research examining the returns surrounding the announcement date or research
examining the returns of a larger period. An example of a study combining a longer period (five
years) and stock market data is the study of Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) which re-
examined the post-merger performance of acquiring firms. They found that stockholders of the
acquiring firms suffered a statistically significant loss of about 10% over the five year post-merger
period. This may indicate that the merging firm is not showing value-maximizing behaviour, but
hubris behaviour, resulting either from pursuing other goals than their shareholders’ welfare or from
being unable to pursue shareholder value.
But does it really matter which criterion is being used to measure performance? Douma and Kabir
(1995) studied the correlation between six performance indicators, namely three accounting returns
(return on equity, return on total capital and net profit margin), market return and two hybrid
measures (P/E ration and Q-index). Their sample consisted of 123 firms listed at the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange in the period 1988-1992. They found, for large firms only, a significant correlation
between market return and the accounting rates of return. They concluded that measuring the
performance of one company should be done with more than one indicator, while for a group of
companies the difference between an accounting measure or market return probably will be negli-
gible.
4.2 Comparing performance with market, industry or absolute.
The risk-adjusted performance of the firm can be assessed on a stand-alone basis, or can be
compared to the stock-market or to its industry. This results in three levels of distress. MarketRestructuring, ..... December 1995 15
distress occurs when the company underperforms the stock-market in general. Market distress will
not always lead to firm distress, a firm can underperform a long time before insolvency occurs.
Industry distress only is defined as underperforming its industry.
Firm distress (or financial distress) is a situation where cash flow is insufficient to cover current obli-
gations. Financial distress is often associated with the terms failure and default. According to
Altman (1993) failure is the situation in which the realized rate of return on invested capital, with
allowances for risk consideration, is significantly and continually lower than prevailing rates on
similar investments. A company can be a failure for many years without going bankrupt, namely
when all current obligations can be met and the debt is not enforceable. When a firm defaults,i t
violates the agreements with one (or more) creditor class(es). In case of a payment default, the
company forgoes an interest or a principal payment. A technical default is when a firm breaches a
financial covenant in the firm’s debt, like the debt/equity ratio. Note that in both cases a formal
default is not always necessary, terms of debt can be rescheduled privately.
Figure 7 shows the difference between market
Figure 7 Market, industry and firm return
Market Industry Firm
return return return
Example 1 10 % 5% 5%
Example 2 10% 10% 5%
Example 3 5% 10% 5%
Correction for risk included
and industry distress. Industry and firm return
are risk-adjusted. In example 1, the firm is in
market distress, but not in industry distress,
since the firm is evidently operating in a
troubled industry. The market distress must
therefore be caused by industry-specific fac-
tors. In example 2, the firm is in market as well
as in industry distress, and is operating in a healthy industry. Firm-specific factors must be at the
bottom of the poor performance. Exhibit 3 shows a firm in industry distress only, probably mainly
caused by firm-specific factors.
Firm failure can be caused by industry and/or firm specific factors. Asquit, Gertner and Scharfstein
(1994) found that underperforming their industry was the main cause of firm distress, and not a
troubled industry or too much leverage. Others, however, indicated more industry-specific factors,
like recession and regulatory initiatives (Denis and Denis, 1995). Khanna and Poulson (1995) even
indicate that managerial incompetence is not the reason for firm failure, and that the market
perceives this, as is reflected by negative announcement effects of the announcement of mana-
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5 Control mechanisms
The different views on the firm’s goal have a direct impact on the functioning of the internal and
external controls. The different control mechanisms are depicted in Figure 8.
Control mechanisms are installed to monitor
Figure 8 Control mechanisms
management, and, if a performance shortfall is
observed, to compel change by threatening to
or by actually disciplining management. The
control mechanisms generally imply an
increased monitoring by third parties, that is
not management, either within or outside the
firm. The labour market (Fama, 1980) monitors
management, determining future career
possibilities and rewards of the incumbent
management. By posing a take-over threat, the
market for corporate control disciplines man-
agement (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
A greater reliance on debt, that is monitoring
by the capital markets, is also able to improve
performance (Jensen,1986a). The product
markets influence the performance of the managers. In the US view, generally only two internal
control mechanisms are important, namely blockholders and the board, the latter being able to set
the incentives for, as well as being able to hire and fire management.
In the Netherlands, the works council is also a control mechanism, only not aimed at diminishing the
agency problems between shareholders and management, but between employees and manage-
ment.
The various control mechanisms have each their own possibilities and incentives to exert pressure
on management. Agreement about the effectiveness of the various control mechanisms is not yet
reached. Jensen (1993) says "the chronic over-investment and overstaffing of such companies (...
GM, IBM, Xerox and Kodak) reflects the widespread failure of our corporate internal control sys-
tems. And it is this fundamental control problem which give rise to the corporate restructuring
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5.1 Board of directors and insider ownership
The Dutch board is fundamentally different from the Anglo-Saxon board. Not only does Dutch
legislature prescribes the balanced stakeholder view (see section 2) instead of the in the US
prevailing shareholder view, it also excludes, for large companies, the possibility of insider
supervisory board directorship. This applies for large companies subject to the "structuurregime",
which depends on the amount of the equity and reserves, the number of employees active in The
Netherlands and the legal obligation to institute a works council.
The Dutch legislature has expressed the balanced stakeholder view in, for example, the required
approval by the supervisory board of directors of certain management decisions. These manage-
ment decisions are exhaustively listed, and include significant events like major mergers, disposals
or investments as well as the forced dismissal of a substantial number of employees. Besides this
element of control, the structuurregime also covers the re-distribution of power over the diverse
stakeholders. The power is shifted from shareholders to the supervisory board, and thus to other
stakeholders; the board now has the right to appoint and discharge management, and to assess the
annual account. The shareholders may only reject or approve the annual accounts. This consider-
ation for stakeholders other than shareholders alone is in contrast to the United States, where the
directors legally have the duties of care and loyalty. The duty of loyalty means that a director must
demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company’s shareholders, while the duty of care means that a
director must exercise due diligence in making decisions.
12 Even though, Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1989) found that "even when board members know how to raise value, they may refuse to
do so because the required changes in a declining industry (layoffs, investment cutbacks, and
divestures) harm employees who are considered more important to the organization than share-
holders who are only ’out for speculative profit’."
Dutch law explicitly
13 declares that the position of member of the supervisory board is incompatible
with a position within the same, or within a dependent firm. Consequently, the American one-tier
system, uniting insiders (managing executives) and outside experts on the board is unknown in the
Netherlands. In the two-tier system, which is also applicable in, for example, Germany, the upper,
supervisory, board consists only of non-executives, with the task of monitoring the lower, or
managing board, whose task is managing the company. Owing to the Dutch regulation of incompati-
bility, some Anglo-Saxon tendencies relating to the board-composition, are not known in the
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The first tendency is to increase the ratio of outsiders versus insiders. Research in this area has
become extensive in recent years, and generally finds that greater outside representation on boards
is more effective in monitoring top management.
14
Secondly, combining the functions of chairman of the board, and that of chief executive officer was
common practice in the United States. This combination of functions has several drawbacks. First of
all, the interests to be protected by the CEO/chairman are incompatible. The main priority of the
chairman of an American board has to be guarding his shareholder interests, while the CEO has to
look after the interests of several groups of stakeholders. Also, the representatives of duality have
been accused of influencing the board composition and tenure, setting the board agenda and
controlling information flows, influencing development of corporate strategy and resisting executive
change when necessary.
15 Therefore, duality may result in a reduced board independence and
thus in a restricted board oversight. On the other hand, in favour of this duality (CEO as chairman)
is a clear-cut leadership, and the existence of only one spokesman. Nowadays, these two functions
are often separated.
Thirdly, American and Britain boards are becoming a "hybrid"-tier system, a one-tier board, with a
clear separation of duties between executive and non-executive members, formalized through sub-
committees as auditing, compensation and nominating.
While Dutch legislature on board incompatibility appears to be progressive, some comments can be
made.
First of all, outsiders can be as dependent on management as insiders. While insiders can be
dependent on management owing to career opportunities, the independence of outsiders may be
undermined by interlocks, the ’old boys network’ or business interests, and, perhaps the most
important, the outsider’s own stockholder group. In other words, the outsider’s first responsibility lies
with his own company and his own share or stakeholders, and this may influence his behaviour in
another company’s board.
Another problem hampering an efficient supervisory board is the availability of information. While
insiders have continuous access to the relevant information, outsiders are dependent on the
information they are provided with. Getting the right information on time and interpreting it correctly
is therefore one of the main causes of the failure of the internal controls. Information on the financial
performance should be subject to regular monitoring by board members. Donaldson (1994, p.207)
indicates that the following information should be available regarding the investment and return on
investment: the company’s own past performance, the company’s principal competitors in the same
product markets and for the industry as a whole, the company’s principal competitors for funds in
the capital markets that lie in a comparable investment-risk category, and the response of investors
to this performance over an extended period of time. This kind of information enables the board toRestructuring, ..... December 1995 19
assess the performance of the company in three stages, namely absolute, relative to the industry,
as well as relative to the stockmarket (see section 4). With this kind of information, the board can
observe an erosion of economic value in an early stage and prevent intervention by external control
mechanisms.
Thirdly, the post of chairman is now often occupied by the former (retired) CEO, as is the case in
the United States. While the former CEO has an extensive knowledge of the company, he is also
able to dominate the board and to retard radical, but necessary, measures, which should have but
were not executed during his reign.
Although the structures of the American and Dutch boards are different, the two major means of
power to exercise the governance role are the same. When the interests of management and the
groups represented by the board are not aligned, management can either be dismissed and/or have
its incentives altered.
Top management replacement following poor performance has received extensive attention in the
literature, because (complete) top management team turnovers are associated with successful
monitoring by the board (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). These results are not conclusive, but
generally indicate that the board is only effective at spotting and correcting poor performance
relative to their own industries, and is ineffective at monitoring when the industry as a whole is
performing below standard, ie. when the industry is not healthy (Ofek, 1993; Weston, Chung and
Hoag,1990). Morck et al. concluded that "internally precipitated complete turnover of the top of the
management team (,...,) is more likely to occur in firms that underperform their industry, but is no
more likely to occur in troubled than in healthy industries". They argue that the board uses firms in
the same industry as a benchmark for the results and only intervenes when poor performance
relative to industry is assessed. Further, Morck et al. showed that the disciplining mechanisms
differ. Poor industry performance tends to be disciplined by the market for corporate control, through
a hostile takeover, while poor performance relative to the industry is disciplined by internal controls,
by management turnover. This also indicates that the board will not be the main instigator of down
sizing an industry.
The disfunctioning of boards in times of troubled industries is alarming since excess capacity, and
thus the necessity of exit, has increased. Jensen (1993) discussed in his Presidential Address to
the American Finance Association the causes of excess capacity which started in the 1980s.
Among other things he points out the changes in technology,
16 globalization of trade and the
organizational innovations like virtual organizations
17 and Japanese management techniques. The
United States steel industry during the 1980s is an example of an industry with excess capacity (in
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increased competition, a decline in demand and technological obsolescence of aging plants,
resulted in huge losses for the industry as a whole ($9.5 billion for the seven major integrated pro-
ducers, from 1983-1986)
18 as well as for the major seven companies.
Besides being able to dismiss the management, boards also determine the compensation of the
managers. Especially the American boards are under a strain to link those salaries more closely to
(share) performance. The SEC now even requires firms to explain the link between top salaries and
performance, otherwise tax relief on large salaries will be difficult. In the United Kingdom, executive
share options have become the focus of attention, due to among other things, the "windfall" profits
realized by directors of the recently privatized utilities and the "pay bonanza" of top executives. In
general, it might be difficult to control excessive pay for top managers, since, at least in the United
Kingdom, the dominant institutional shareholders of these companies are governed themselves by
those same top managers, sitting on the trustee boards.
5.2 Product markets
The product markets (both the input and the output market) are a major disciplining basic force.
Pressure from the product markets is always present, except perhaps when competition is limited.
Research on product markets interaction with capital structure finds that taking into account
exogenous industry conditions will aid in explaining investment and plant closing decisions
19.
5.3 Labour markets
The internal as well as the external labour market may discipline management. A manager has a
market value as well. His value is based on, among other things, performance of the firm in relation
to the standards.
20 Since establishing the influences of this disciplining force is extremely difficult,
this force will not be discussed any further.
The characteristics of management and/or the CEO are found to be important in explaining which
control mechanisms will be used. Generally, the following characteristics are used: age of the CEO,
the number of years the CEO has been with the firm, and his tenure as CEO, as well as whether he
is the founder of the firm or not
21.
5.4 Large blockholders
Recently, research on concentrated equity ownership has been extensive. Small shareholders are
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case the small shareholder takes action, most of the benefits would accrue to the other share-
holders, while all costs are borne by the shareholder. The importance of the free-rider problem
differs among the countries, since the concentration of equity in various countries is not the same.
The profile of the average shareholder of the "Japanese-German" model is an institution with a big
stake in the company (Germany) or cross-shareholdings (Japan). In Japan, the keiretsu exists, "an
affiliation of related companies whose interests are aligned partly trough long-lasting and informal
supply contracts, intercompany personnel transfer, and reciprocal equity ownership."
22 In contrast
to Japan and Germany, about half of the shares in the United States are held by individuals, and
the other half by institutions. Moerland (1995) described the Dutch market as rather illiquid, and
gives the following figures of Dutch listed companies: the largest blockholder has an average
interest of 31%, in about 25% of the listed firms the largest blockholder has majority, and more than
50% of the shares of the listed firms is in the hands of blockholders (more than 5% control). Owing
to these large stakes in the company, shares become more illiquid, thus forcing these shareholders
to be involved in monitoring the managers. Based on these figures, prerequisites for control
enforced by large blockholders in the Netherlands are present.
5.5 Banks and Institutions
Banks and institutions are important control mechanisms, providing debt and/or equity to firms. The
workings of these institutions differ among countries. For instance in Japan, the company’s main
bank monitors the company more closely, and, because the bank provides often debt as well as
equity, is able to intervene in a much earlier stage of performance shortfall than their American
counterparts, providing only debt. Although American banks may have the right information and
expertise to assess the need for change, they may not have the right tools to force this change.
When banks provide only debt, and the loan covenants contain solely absolute performance
indicators, intervention is only possible if the company is in actual distress and forfeits a payment or
other obligation. Consequently, banks are unable to intervene when a company is underperforming
its industry, and is not earning an adequate rate of return, but is still able to fulfil its obligations.
Institutions however, are in a different category all-together, because of their equity-holdings as well
as of the sheer size of these holdings. In the United States, institutional investors owned in 1989
about 56% of the equity of the top 100 companies, and this percentage is still growing. While most
institutions are still inactive, some institutions are becoming more involved with the management of
their portfolio firms. A well-known example of an active pension fund is CalPERS, the California
Public Employees’ Retirement System. This pension fund monitors the effectiveness of the firms in
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However, this increased monitoring also brings up other issues like the impact of insider trading.
According to Maug (1995b) institutional investors wish to acquire information relevant for valuing
companies, without receiving information labelled "price sensitive" by the authorities. To avoid this
problem, institutions may avoid to acquire sensitive information altogether, which reduces their
effectiveness as monitors.
An other issue raised by the increasing importance of institutions is its role in the converging of the
two corporate models. Institutions are not always strictly concerned with economic interests, but
often with the interests of their pensioners. And these interests also include items such as the
environment, health and education.
Seen from the firm’s point of view, debt has a disciplining role; high-leverage firms generally
respond faster to a decline in firm value than a low-leverage firm, because the first firm reaches the
default-triggering value earlier than the less leveraged firm (Jensen 1986, Wruck 1990). Pres-
ervation of value is therefore one of the advantages of high leverage, the high-leverage firm will
default and restructure earlier then its low-leverage counterpart. The positive relation between
leverage and operational actions can also be explained by the monitoring role of debtholders after
default (Ofek, 1993). Only, in general the firm will not default in case of stock base insolvency only,
since creditors are not allowed to intervene. This implies an absence of a relation between leverage
and the probability of operational actions affecting operational efficiency and/or asset use, when the
firm is underperforming in its industry and not in financial distress, unless the bank covenants
include some restriction on net worth.
5.6 The market for corporate control
The more serious the threat the market for corporate control can pose on management, the more
managers will try to maximize firm value. A take-over often results in management turnover, and
management pursues job security. Consequently, a more active market for corporate control will
force managers to act in the interests of their shareholders. Once companies are "lean and mean"
hostile raiders are less interested in those companies since the gap between actual performance
and potential performance is small. Only, management has several possibilities to entrench
themselves from the influence of the market for corporate control and thwart a takeover bid. A
distinguishing characteristic of these management tactics is the necessity of shareholder approval.
Dann and DeAngelo (1988) studied defensive restructurings, "corporate asset and ownership
structure changes -acquisitions, divestures, and issuances and repurchases of voting securities- that
target managers announced in response to hostile takeover attempts." They concluded that the
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the stockholders. When anti-takeover defences are installed to protect the company from the
regulating force of the market for corporate control, unsatisfactory performance will remain
unpunished.
Anti-takeover devices installed by the managers was one of the reasons shareholder activism
increased in the United States. Those anti-takeover devices restrain the opportunity to remove
incumbent management if someone else could control the assets better. Anti-takeover devices are
now also in the focus of attention in the Netherlands, since the public opinion on hostile takeovers is
changing. Even in Germany hostile takeovers are appearing.
5.7 Conclusion control mechanisms.
Figure 9 Feedback and intervention methods of some stakeholders and
control mechanisms
Feedback Intervention
Board of directors Counselling Discharge man-
agement or alter
incentives
Works Council Counselling Appeal to Enter-
prise Chamber
Personnel Turnover rate Strike










Control mechanisms are able to influence cor-
porate strategy in at least two ways. First of all,
control mechanisms supply management with
a day-to-day feedback on firm performance,
thereby giving management a chance to grad-
ually adjust the firm-specific structures.
Examples of this day-to-day feedback are the
counselling functions of the board and the
works council, and a drop in bond rating and
stock price. Secondly, the control mechanisms
can induce or even force management to exe-
cute changes in the major structure and/or strategy. For example, the board of directors is able to
discharge management, the works council can appeal to the Enterprise Chamber and the capital
markets can refuse to issue more loans. In Figure 9 the feedback and intervention possibilities of
the diverse control mechanisms are depicted.
The board is effective at spotting poor performance relative to its industry, while poor performance
relative to the market is less frequently corrected. When the whole industry is performing below
average, boards are not inclined to punish management, since they are not convinced that
management is to blame. When a firm is performing below industry average, however, board tend
to blame management, resulting in a disciplining action. Debt, on the other hand, corrects an
absolute, and not a relative, decline in value, and may therefore be complementary to the working
of the board. Dutch banks have generally stipulated sufficient guarantees for their loans, and will
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mechanisms have not always the same procedures, goals, or possibilities, although a converging
trend is identifiable. While the Dutch market is rather illiquid, the American stock-market used to be
characterized by small shareholders. Nowadays, the American institutions are playing a more
prominent part. Large blockholdings make a market more illiquid. In illiquid markets, stock prices do
not have to reflect the price that would have been effected in a liquid market, thereby reducing the
feedback opportunities of the stock price. This is one of the reasons large blockholders should
Also, only recently Dutch opinion is starting to accept a hostile takeover, which are the order of the
day in the United States. Figure 10 summarizes the timely intervention prospects by the mechan-
isms.
Figure 10 Timely intervention prospects of some control mechanisms
Control mechanisms Timely intervention prospects by the mechanism in the Netherlands
Board of directors Depends upon, among others, information available, frequency of the meetings and indepen-
dence of directors. Two-tier board is positive.
Large blockholders Dutch market is rather illiquid, forcing involvement of these shareholders.
Banks/institutions Dutch banks have generally stipulated sufficient guarantees for their loans, and will only
enforce timely change when they also hold shares.
Corporate control Dutch opinion on hostile takeover is changing to acceptance. Dutch anti-takeover measures
are under scrutiny. Intervention becomes more accepted.
6 Voluntary or involuntary?
Changes are implemented involuntarily when they are a response to an overt or threatened
adversarial pressure by external mechanisms. Distressed firms that have defaulted and are trying to
solve their financial difficulties are obvious examples of involuntary restructurings. Creditors are now
able to intervene, and force changes within the firm. Going private as a response to a take-over
threat, followed by a major reorganization is also an example of an involuntary change.
Consequently, a voluntary change is accomplished under normal governance procedures, without a
threat by external mechanisms to intervene. For example, one of the rights of the Dutch works
councils is to object to a proposed appointment of a manager or a member of the supervisory board
and, if management does not follow its recommendations, appeal to the Enterprise Chamber
(Ondernemingskamer). Here, management acts voluntarily, that is within normal governance
procedures, when it retraces its steps and follows the council’s recommendation. In contrast, the
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voluntary and involuntary change lies a grey undefined and undefinable area, since when is a
"threat" exercised? Must stock be actually acquired by a hostile firm, or is a large takeover turmoil
in the industry sufficient?
To my best knowledge, no empirical research has as yet been conducted into the consequences of









a voluntary versus an involuntary restructuring. There are some indications that a voluntary
restructuring generally preserves more value. One of the advocates of this view is Stewart (1991,
p.599), who claims that "a voluntary restructuring produces a company that is more cohesive, more
valuable, and more financially flexible than those in which a third party has set the agenda. We
have found the most effective financial restructurings to be those initiated by management and not
an outsider, either all at once as a preemptive strike or, maybe even better, as a natural comple-
ment to the company’s ongoing business strategy". Maug (1995a)
developed a specific model in which he contrasts independent
outside directors with alternative control mechanisms. His model
provides a ranking, depicted in Figure 11, of the alternative
governance structures. "Strong’ and "weak" relate to the bargain-
ing position of the directors versus executive management. Maug
provides two reasons why weak directors are the worst possible
solution, namely (1) management is able to extract excessive
compensation and (2) the link between managers’ benefits and
their performance is loosened. In the managerial control case
managements’ benefits are fixed, while only managers have
control. His overall conclusion is that "independent directors can thus be seen as an institution that
permit the same kind of negotiation in a widely held corporation in which shareholders cannot
influence production decision directly. The important insight is that in widely held companies control
had to be delegated to two institutions or agents: managers, who are in charge of the day to day
running of the firm, and directors who monitor and review contracts and use this right as an
instrument to influence business decision."
A shift in bargaining power is one of the four reasons why a voluntary restructuring is preferable to
an involuntary, see Figure 12. Usually this shift in power occurs from management and share-
holders to debtholders, consequently the firm has to implement the changes involuntary. Even so,
who actually gains power and who loses it, and the subsequent redistribution of wealth over the
various claimants, depends on the underlying reason for distress, and the trumps held by the
stakeholders. The conflict of interests between equity-holders and creditors of a firm in distress is
partly due to the priority of their claims. The claims of equity-holders have a low priority and an
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equity-holders are in favour of continuing the firm, hoping that the firm will turn around. Liquidating
Figure 12 Problems with involuntary restructurings and the consequences
Problems with an involuntary restructuring Consequences
(Imminent) financial default Shift in bargaining power
Debtholder Opportunism disoptimal capital structure
Free-rider problem Failure of exchange offer
Limited time available More drastic measures
the firm when the proceeds are not sufficient to meet the claims of the creditors is the worst case
for equity-holders. Even continuing the firm and incurring more losses is preferable to liquidation,
since the losses are charged to the creditors, while possible gains will be allocated to the equity-
holders. Consequently, a wealth transfer takes places from creditors to equity-holders. Normally,
creditors will look for measures to limit this wealth transfer.
An undesirable consequence of an involuntary change is a possible disoptimal capital structure, due
to a debtholder opportunism problem, resulting in overleverage. This failure to delever occurs
because debtholders are unwilling to forgive more debt than is necessary to cure the present
default because other debtholders will capture any surplus. In a voluntary restructuring the firm is
able to gradually adjust the capital structure, instead of having to negotiate with debtholders. As a
consequence of this over-leveraging, the bankruptcy rate for financially distressed firms that
renegotiate their debt, is thirty times as high as the rate for an average firm.
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The free-rider problem also does not exist in a voluntary restructuring. This theory states that the
creditor has no incentive to accept a debt restructuring offer, when each creditor considers himself
insignificant to the success of the offer. Because of this, unconditional exchange offers will fail. On
the other hand, if a positive relationship between tendering and the priority status when the firm
goes bankrupt exists, the exchange offer will succeed.
24
The time frame of an involuntary restructuring is also different from that of a voluntary restructuring,
for there is no time to lose. As a consequence, the measures taken are often more drastic and
draconian then they would have been had the restructuring taken place at an earlier time.
7 Outcomes of the restructuring process
In Figure 1, the direct relationship between the goal of the firm and firm performance has been
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followed by, if necessary, intervention. Consequently, inadequate results are caused by either (a)
the optimally set firm goal is not reached, or (b) firm goal is not optimally set or operationalised, i.e.
the mistranslation from firm goal to management goals. An example of the former cause is a critical
change in the product market; structural changes have decreased or even eliminated demand, or
competition has become excessive. An example of the latter cause is over-investment, i.e.
management has undertaken investments with a negative net present value.
Figure 13 Outcomes of the restructuring process
Two main categories of reactions to an inadequate result are possible, namely (1) reactions with
management remaining in control, and (2) reactions with management losing control (Figure 12).
7.1 Management remains in control
Management remains in control, and either management reacts to the need for change or does not
act. In the latter case, although firm performance is not satisfactory, and the need for change
therefore exists, management only makes minor adjustments to the existing strategy and structures,
or changes nothing at all. Firm performance will deteriorate even further, until eventually a control
mechanism will intervene. However, it may take several years before actual intervention by either
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Once management is aware of the need for change and is still in control, they can implement the
necessary changes by either liquidating the firm, restructuring or a takeover/merger. Management
may have two opportunities to implement changes under normal governance procedures, namely
(1) voluntary, changes are prompted by the feedback from the internal or external control mecha-
nisms, and (2) involuntary, changes are prompted by threats from the control mechanisms. The
distinguishing feature between feedback and threats is that feedback is supplied by the markets,
and threats are raised by parties involved. Voluntary changes are then prompted by for example a
falling stock price, the downgrading of debt, uncompetitive labour prices, decreasing sales prices,
increasing purchase prices, liquidity problems or a combination of these feedback signals. Threats
on the other hand can be uttered by parties like equity or debt holders, works councils, suppliers
and buyers, or other companies.
7.2 Management looses control
Management looses control, either because the firm is taken over or because debtors take over as
a result of financial distress. When the firm can not fulfil its obligations, several ways for a debt
restructuring or liquidation exist. In The Netherlands, there are the following possibilities, namely (a)
bankruptcy (comparable to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code), resulting in liquidation of the firm,
(b) bankruptcy resulting in an agreement with the creditors, (c) surséance (comparable to Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code) followed by bankruptcy and (d) surséance followed by settlement, and
(e) private work-out or negotiated restructuring. At present, the interests of the creditors are
paramount in Dutch Bankruptcy proceedings, while a surséance is directed at continuing the -
slimmed down- firm, although it is usually the porch of bankruptcy.
The in-court process usually takes a long time, and in the Netherlands more than 90% of the firms
in surséance are finally liquidated. Also, absolute priority is not always maintained in-court. Another
disadvantage of an in-court restructuring is the publicity, the firm’s difficulties are made known to
suppliers and customers, thus hindering the normal conduct of business. The out-of-court option
refers to the process in which firms try to restructure their debt privately rather than through formal
bankruptcy.
One of the major differences between an in-court and an out-of-court (informal) restructuring is that
in-court all creditors’ securities must be exchanged, while in an out-of-court restructuring only a
subset of securities outstanding have to be exchanged. Consequently, an out-of-court restructuring
seems easier. Whether it indeed is easier is influenced by the number of creditors in the restru-
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while in an out-of-court restructuring all of the creditors in the class have to agree. So when one
creditor holds out for better terms, the offer may fail. Gilson, John and Lang (1990) state that when
the net costs of an out-of-court settlement are lower than the net costs of an in-court settlement, the
shareholders and creditors as a group will benefit. The different categories of claimholders should
agree on how to share these cost savings. Once individual claimholders are holding out, because
they expect to get more benefits, the in-court restructuring becomes more likely. Another factor
affecting creditors’ willingness to settle privately is the type of debt that is restructured. They found
that 90% of the outstanding bank debt was restructured, versus 69.8% of publicly traded debt. This
means that firms, which restructure privately, do not need to recontract all claimholders, but only
those whose claims are in default, resulting in lower transaction costs. A hybrid-form of debt
restructuring has emerged in the United States, namely the pre-packaged Chapter 11. In a pre-
packaged bankruptcy, the firm agrees upon a restructuring with a sufficient number and amount of
claimants and then legally files for bankruptcy (Altman, 1993).
8 Research on changes implemented by incumbent management
In this section a first overview of research on change implemented by incumbent management, as a
response to inadequate results, is presented. The research on lost control cases is outside the
scope of this paper.
8.1 Restructuring
Studies on restructuring under normal governance procedures can be divided into case studies and
statistically large-sample studies. Donaldson (1994, 1990) and Baker (1992) focused on case
studies, while Ofek (1993), John, Lang and Netter (1992) and Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) used
the latter methodology, but each with a totally different angle (see Figure 14).
Figure 14 Research methodology
One possible large-sample study
approach is to sample on basis of
some action the firm has taken,
such as an unit liquidation, or unit
merger. Subsequently, the there-
upon following stock market reac-
tion and/or change in earnings is
measured (event study). This
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Brickley and Van Drunen (1990). The opposite approach is to sample on basis of stock or earnings
performance, and look at the actions the sampled firm undertakes as a response to this perform-
ance. This approach has been followed by Ofek as well as by John, Lang and Netter.
Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) investigated the factors motivating changes in the organizational
structure of the firm. They sampled on basis of the action taken by the firm, such as unit liquidation,
unit mergers and unit split-ups. Subsequently, they measured (a) the shareholder wealth effects of
announcements of the organizational restructurings and (b) the stock price as well as the earnings
performance in the years surrounding these actions. They found that restructurings often occurred
without evidence of take-over threats. Except for unit liquidations, the stock market tends to react
favourably on the restructurings both when the restructuring is performed to increase efficiency and
when it is performed as an expansion strategy. Remarkably, earnings performance declines in the
three years after the restructuring, probably caused by restructuring-related expenses, such as
employee severance pay, which tend to reduce reported earnings. Earnings performance was
measured as the market- and industry-adjusted rates of return on equity as well as the market-
adjusted net sales-equity and expense-equity ratios. The sampled firms experienced poor stock as
well as poor earnings performance in the period prior to restructuring, only if the stated reason for
restructuring was to increase efficiency. Otherwise prior performance was normal. This indicates
that the market pressured for more optimal organizational structures.
Ofek (1993), in a sample study of 358 firms, investigated the relation between capital structure and
a firm’s response to short-term financial distress. Stock market data were used to identify the firms
with poor performance and a rapid decline in value. This decline is defined as an annual stock
return in the bottom 10% of all returns in the market after having been in the top 67% the year
before. Reported earnings declined also substantially (-39% median change in earnings before
interest, taxes and depreciation, standardized by sales). No background information is provided on
the reasons why this drop in value has occurred, while the reason for such a decline might have a
direct relationship with the actions the firm undertakes. For example, the response to a decline in
value caused by a major law-suit will be different from a response to a decline caused by a loss of
market share.
The firm’s responses to the performance were classified into the categories asset restructuring,
employee lay-off, top management replacement, debt restructuring, bankruptcy filings and dividend
changes. Ofek found a positive relationship between leverage and operational actions as well as
leverage and financial actions. Remarkably, this relationship is missing for firms in industry distress
only (underperforming its industry, but not the stock market in general). He concludes that this
emphasizes the importance of an absolute decline in value.Restructuring, ..... December 1995 31
John, Lang and Netter (1992) used negative earnings as a measure of firm performance, and gave
no explanation for the exclusion of stock market data. A sampled firm has had at least one year of
negative earnings, followed by three years of positive earnings. They found that firms reacted
quickly on a performance decline, with actions such as a cut-back of the labour force, dividend
cuts, and assets sales.
They did ask management the reasons (giving more than one reason was allowed) for the
performance decline, which was generally said to be due to exogenous factors including economic
conditions (95%) and competition (57%, foreign 43%). Other reasons mentioned were endogenous
factors like accounting changes (37%), failed acquisitions (37%) or too much debt(13%). They did
not, however, relate the reported reasons for negative earnings to reported responses to poor
performance.
A related study of Khanna and Poulson (1995) identified the managerial actions executed in the
three years before filing for Chapter 11. Subsequently, in an event study, the average abnormal
stock-price reaction to these actions is registered, and compared to the results of a control group.
Overall, they find that both groups make similar decisions, and conclude that financial distress is
due to conditions outside the control of managers, and not a result of managerial incompetence.
Debt restructuring has been examined as one of the reactions following poor performance.
Voluntary debt restructurings can also occur, for example when a highly leveraged firm wants to
invest in a positive net present value project, and therefore needs to reschedule its debt repayment
schedule. No research in this field has come to my knowledge.
The above studies leave many questions about details unanswered, which is of course due to the
large-sample design. Case studies are able to provide some answers on these questions.
Donaldson (1994) described twelve case studies, diverging from purely voluntary to involuntary
restructurings. These firms were followed for two decades or more, thereby allowing a deeper
insight in the firm’s actions and reactions in a changing environment. He points out that while some
preconditions of voluntary restructuring exist, such as the willingness and ability to act, some
environmental shock is often necessary to trigger the restructuring, such as the retirement of a
CEO.
Baker (1992) described the history of Beatrice, an American firm. During these 100 years, Beatrice
grew from a local creamery into a diversified firm by acquisitions, and slimmed down again by a
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destroyed. His central question was How could the acquisition of hundreds of companies create
value, and then the subsequent divestures of these same assets thirty years later also create
value? By answering this question he provides a detailed insight in how diversification could add
value (Beatrice could eliminate the knowledge as well as the financial gap of the acquired smaller
companies), how the reversals could also add value (change in economic environment, the financial
and managerial resources were now also available for small firms) and in the importance of
organizational structure and governance. For this purpose, he used performance measures like
cumulative abnormal dollar returns, book values of assets, market reactions to announcements of
acquisitions and divestures and return on assets.
Summarizing, Brickley and Van Drunen found that the stock market generally reacts favourably to
restructuring activities. Research designs such as those of Ofek provide insight in why firms choose
certain responses over others, while the case studies open-up the black-box of the firms and
provide detailed , mainly institutional, background on issues raised by the large-sample studies. The
case studies also cover an extended period of time, thereby linking changes in the economic
environment, the responses of management, and the consequences of these responses. Therefore,
case studies, despite its well-known drawbacks, provide an essential complement to large-sample
studies.
8.2 Friendly and hostile take-over/merger
Many reasons have been advanced why take-overs and mergers take place. For a discussion of
these reasons see Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990), who identified no less than thirteen rea-
sons/theories and also reviewed the research on these subjects.
After the take-over/merger, restructuring often takes place after all, but now executed by the
acquiring firm. Raiding a company is only effective when a firm is not managed based on the
shareholders’ wealth principle. Because when it is, the firm is already "lean and mean", with no
excess staff. Putting takeovers parallel to restructuring in the restructuring process (see Figure 1)
without a connecting loop might seem surprising. However, the takeover is the result of the
intervention by present control mechanisms. As a matter of course, these control mechanisms and
perhaps even the goal of the firm, changes after the take-over, thereby necessitating another round
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8.3 Liquidation
Liquidation executed by incumbent management, as well voluntary as involuntary, corresponds with
voluntary corporate liquidation, which involves the piece-meal selling of the entire firm. It should be
executed, from the shareholder’s point of view, when the liquidation value is higher than the firm’s
going concern value less the face value of its outstanding debt. A voluntary liquidation is preferable
to a merger only when the separate pieces can be used for higher-valued-uses by the different
buyers than one buyer could have for the total firm, because only then the receipts of liquidation will
be higher. A voluntary liquidation differs from an involuntary liquidation since it is a management
decision, instead of (generally) a bankruptcy proceeding. Of course, threats may be exercised and
studies by Erwin and McConnell (1995) and Kim and Schatzberg (1987) found frequent attempts,
either friendly or hostile, to change control prior to the liquidation (both studies find attempts in
about one third of the sample).
Both studies indicate that the voluntary liquidation is an value-enhancing decision for the existing
shareholders. Erwin and McConnell found that the discounted value of actual cash flows (i.e. the
actual receipts of liquidation) generated by the liquidating firm was on average 16.6% higher than
the stock price prior to the liquidation announcement, while the average of the announcement
period returns of 19.8% was found. They have not investigated whether any wealth transfer from
bondholders or personnel to shareholders has taken place. Kim and Schatzberg do investigate
whether wealth is transferred from bondholders to stockholders, and they conclude that on average
bondholders have profited. Whether any wealth transfer exists from personnel to shareholders is not
investigated.
Erwin and McConnell concluded that the firms in their sample are confronted not so much with low
current profitability as with the absence of future growth opportunities
25. Low growth opportunities
are however not decisive, decision makers should also be shareholders and/or the founder (family)
should be present on the board.
Voluntary liquidations can also exist on plant level. In this case the firm’s stock market value after
the liquidation announcement does not only depend on net present value of the liquidation decision,
but also on the information content of the announcement. Blackwell, Marr and Spivey (1990) as well
as Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) found a significant negative stock market reaction to unit
liquidations. This could indicate that the negative value of the information content of this message
exceeds the positive net present value of the liquidation found in the corporate liquidations. Both
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9 Conclusion
In this paper the relationship between restructuring, firm performance and control mechanisms has
been described, by means of an overall restructuring process. It has not been the intention to give
an opinion on how the corporate goal should be set. One of the consequences of not pursuing
shareholder value may be pursuing growth, and thereby emphasizing quantity instead of quality in
the asset structure, or the availability of more excess capital in the firm.
The overall restructuring process starts with the goal of the firm, which depends, amongst others,
on the bargaining power of the various groups of stakeholders. According to Donaldson (1994), the
United States experienced a shift to the domination of capital investors away from the domination of
the human capital investors. In the Netherlands, the balanced stakeholders’ view is still prevailing,
because of, amongst others, rights granted to works councils and supervisory boards, as well as a
secondary importance of the market for corporate control. However, world wide views are converg-
ing, owing to amongst others the globalization of investment and capital flows. Signals are the
occurrence of hostile take-overs in Germany and the loosening of the keiretsu relationships.
The five basic structures, asset, capital, governance, cost and organization, are directly related to
the goal of the firm, and state the status quo of the firm at the beginning of the process. These five
structures, however, are always in a process of change. A firm should adapt to the continually
changing environment if the firm wants to survive in the long-run. When the firm, operating under
normal governance rules, is unable to adjust, external control mechanisms will enforce the change.
Ideally however, changes should be implemented while performance is still (almost) up to stan-
dards. Performance measurements should consist of firm results (e.g. ROI) and feedback signals
from the control mechanisms, such as stock market data and labour turnover. The reaction to sub-
standard performance can be five-fold: (1) management does not implement changes, in time this
will be followed by one of the other four events, (2) management implements the changes
voluntarily, (3) management implements the changes involuntarily, as a result of threats from
internal or external controls, (4) the board of directors fires the incumbent management and hires a
new management which implements the necessary changes, and (5) external controls step in and
force changes. Changes are involuntarily when implementation is a response to an overt or
threatened adversarial pressure by external mechanisms. Four of the differences between a
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restructuring, the possibility of the free-rider problem and more drastic measures. Whether
externally enforced restructurings are more efficient than internal restructurings is still open to
debate, and is an area open to further research.
Dutch and American control mechanisms operate in different environments, and have different
characteristics. For example, the Dutch board is fundamentally different from the American board,
since (1) the balanced stakeholder’s view is prescribed in the Netherlands, while (2) insider
supervisory board directorship is excluded. Consequently, the American discussion about the ratio
of outsiders versus insiders as well as duality is not carried on in the Netherlands.
The board should assess the performance of the company in three stages, namely (1) absolute, (2)
relative to the industry, and (3) relative to the stockmarket. With this kind of information, the board
can observe an erosion of economic value in an early stage and prevent intervention by external
control mechanisms. Also, the Dutch stockmarket is rather illiquid, forcing involvement of the large
blockholders. Dutch banks have generally stipulated sufficient guarantees for their loans, and will
only enforce timely change when they also hold shares. Dutch opinion on hostile takeover is chan-
ging to acceptance, while Dutch anti-takeover measures are under scrutiny. Intervention by the
market for corporate control becomes more accepted.
While some evidence exists about which factors trigger an early reaction to poor performance, such
as predistress leverage, it is still hardly understood why some firms are able to restructure
voluntary. Insight into this matter can shed light on the reasons why other firms are unable to adapt,
eventually resulting in firm distress. Frequently only one structure causes the initial problems, while
in time other structures are negatively affected. Consequently, the odds are that the longer
management takes to react, the more radical the necessary changes will be.
Evidence on restructurings is brought forward through studies with a different design. Brickley and
Van Drunen found that the stock market generally reacts favourably to restructuring activities.
Research designs such as those of Ofek provide insight in why firms choose certain responses over
others, while the case studies open-up the black-box of the firms and provide detailed background
on issues raised by the large-sample studies. This is necessary because restructurings may consist
of the following sequential steps, after the company becomes aware that it is performing below
standard. The first step may be reducing the number of employees (cost structure), followed by the
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next step can be changing the incentives of management (governance structure) and the internal
structures. Consequently, restructuring must not be seen as an individual transaction, but as a
process, generally taking several years to complete. Case studies cover this extended period of
time, thereby linking changes in the economic environment, the responses of management, and the
consequences of these responses. Therefore, case studies, despite its drawbacks, provide an
essential complement to large-sample studies.Restructuring, ..... December 1995 37
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